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Chief Justice Leadership: A Brief Sketch  
of Its Landscape, Structure, and Operation* 
DAVID A. ROOT 
University of Indianapolis 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines chief justice leadership of the United States Supreme 
Court during the judicial decision-making process and develops a model 
of such leadership in three distinct parts: landscape, structure, and 
operation. The landscape consists of five interactive stages in the judicial 
decision-making process: certiorari, oral argument, conference, majority 
opinion assignment, and opinion drafting. Structurally, three prevailing 
conditions on the Court create a “democratic default”: life tenure, equal 
vote, and free voice. In terms of operation, the office employs small-group 
leadership and its twin pillars of task and social leadership in conjunction 
with behavioral leadership and its three types of leadership (autocratic, 
laissez-faire, and democratic). To highlight both small-group and 
behavioral leadership in action, case studies on Chief Justices Marshall, 
Stone, and Warren are briefly described. While no one leadership style is 
exclusively employed, the contours of chief justice leadership are chiefly 
social and democratic, making these leadership forms dominant. As such, 
the key finding of this paper is that, in order to successfully lead the court, 
the chief justice must be just as good a political negotiator as a competent 
legal judge. 
KEY WORDS  Chief Justice; Supreme Court; Leadership; Small-Group Leadership; 
Task Leadership 
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Since the United States Supreme Court established the power of judicial review in 
Marbury v. Madison (1803), the chief justice has led a powerful institution of 
constitutional import. The office has played a crucial role in the pressing issues of the 
times, from the establishment of national supremacy in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) to 
the question of slavery in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), racial segregation and “separate 
but equal” in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), economic recovery during the Great Depression 
in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), racial 
desegregation in public education and beyond in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 
abortion and reproductive rights in Roe v. Wade (1973), electing the president in Bush v. 
Gore (2000), and comprehensive healthcare reform in National Federation of 
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (2012). In each of these cases, which represent only a 
small portion of the landmark decisions handed down by the court, the chief justice has 
served as the institution’s leader and namesake. 
But how, exactly, does the chief justice lead the court? Is she simply a task master 
distributing responsibilities and deadlines and overseeing the judicial decision-making 
process? Does she concern herself with the justices’ social relationships? How much 
control does she wield in the judicial decision-making process—all, none, or some? 
Despite the office’s central role on the court and its institutional impact on 
constitutional law, questions such as these concerning its leadership remain severely 
understudied in the judicial literature. Rather than investigating them with a vigor 
commensurate to the office’s power and efficacy, when looking at chief justice 
leadership, the academy has typically done little more than zero in on analyses of 
aggregate majority opinion assignment patterns, neglecting the deeper thread of the 
office’s leadership. Consequently, little research investigates the office’s central role in 
the execution of its chief function to guide the court through the judicial decision-making 
process, making such an inquiry a valuable endeavor in the scholarship. As such, 
identifying the landscape, structure, and operation of chief justice leadership sets a robust 
base on which to build a solid model.  
Danelski (1960) lays out a landscape by identifying five interactive stages of the 
judicial decision-making process: certiorari, oral argument, conference, majority opinion 
assignment, and opinion drafting. Given the amount of attention paid in the judicial 
literature to the chief justice’s assignment of majority opinions at the expense of the other 
four stages, Danelski’s schema provides an untapped institutional foundation to develop a 
more thorough model of chief justice leadership. 
Building on the sturdy landscape provided by these five interactive stages, the 
model of chief justice leadership advanced here next adds a structural level of conditions 
that prevail on the court and create what can be called the democratic default. These 
conditions include life tenure, equal vote, and free voice. Each of these conditions 
influences how the chief justice leads the court, by creating a unique atmosphere of 
judicial independence, equality, and autonomy. 
Finally, from the leadership literature, small-group leadership and behavioral 
leadership provide two concurrent lenses with which to view chief justice leadership in 
operation. As the leader of nine justices on the court, the office exercises Verba’s (1961) 
twin towers of small-group leadership: task leadership and social leadership. Using these 
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twin towers as animating forces during each stage of the judicial decision-making 
process, this model of chief justice leadership examines Lewin, Lippitt, and White’s 
(1939) three-way behavioral leadership typology of autocratic, laissez-faire, and 
democratic leadership. 
Combining the democratic default, small-group leadership, and behavioral 
leadership in assessing the court’s progression through the five interactive stages of the 
judicial decision-making process, the model sketched here identifies the office as chiefly 
democratic in structure and operation. This makes democratic leadership the dominant 
behavioral form. Meanwhile, for the small group of justices, social leadership plays an 
outsized role in the chief justice successfully leading the court across the landscape of 
making decisions and issuing opinions. Taken together, they point to the key finding: In 
order to successfully lead the court, the chief justice must be just as good a political 
negotiator as a competent legal judge. 
SKETCHING A MODEL OF CHIEF JUSTICE LEADERSHIP: 
SOURCES, THEORIES, AND METHODS 
In sketching this model of chief justice leadership, the formative research centers on four 
categories of sources that provide theories and methods that have yet to be applied to 
organize the office and study its leadership: justices’ papers and effects, biographies, 
judicial scholarship, and leadership scholarship. In particular, the model advanced here 
relies heavily on the judicial and leadership scholarships to supply the theoretical, 
analytical, and methodological components of investigating chief justice leadership, 
while the justices’ papers and effects and biographies supply much of the empirical data. 
Justices’ Papers and Effects 
A number of justices have left papers, notes, and other writings concerning their time on 
the bench (e.g., Douglas 1981; Frankfurter 1980; Stevens 2011; Story 1851). As such, 
they offer primary source accounts of the judicial decision-making process that otherwise 
may have remained hidden inside the court’s secluded halls, chambers, and conference 
room. Justice Story, who served for more than two decades with Chief Justice Marshall in 
the 19th century, provides candid and lucid insights on the leadership of the great chief 
justice. Meanwhile, Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, and Stevens are fruitful sources to 
draw from regarding the premodern and modern eras. Their combined service of more 
than 100 years coincides with seven chief justices from the late Hughes Court of the 
1930s (Frankfurter and Douglas) through 2010, to the current Roberts Court (Stevens). In 
addition to providing observations from the bench, each justice also knew chief justices 
who served before they did, consequently expanding their coverage to include the whole 
of the 20th century and approximately 10–15 years on each bookend, beginning with 
Chief Justice Fuller (1888–1910) and concluding with Chief Justice Roberts (2005–
present). Working from these justices’ base, other justices’ writings—some from chief 
justices—supply additional examples of chief justice leadership and insights (e.g., 
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Brennan 1974; Curtis 1864; Rehnquist 1986; Roberts et al. 2005; Taft 1925; Warren 
1977; White 1914). 
Biographies 
Biographical works about the chief justices offer additional empirical information 
augmenting the primary source accounts provided by various justices’ papers and effects. 
Much of this biographical work is drawn firsthand from the chief justices’ backgrounds, 
training, professional experiences, and personalities that drove their leadership. For 
instance, significant works have been produced about the three chief justices briefly 
investigated in this sketch: Marshall (autocratic), Stone (laissez-faire), and Warren 
(democratic). [See, for example, Beveridge (1919) for Marshall, Cray (1997) for Warren, 
and Mason (1956) for Stone .] In doing so, biographies offer qualitative pictures of who 
these men were rather than focusing narrowly on behaviors such as majority opinion 
assignment that can be numerically coded, mathematically quantified, and formulaically 
analyzed. In particular, these sources inform scholars of the chief justices’ personal views 
and what specific influences and motivations affected their leadership—considerations 
that go far beyond what is contained in the current judicial literature. Additionally, 
biographies provide the views and perspectives of the biographers, which add further 
depth to the chief justices as both persons and leaders. 
Judicial Scholarship 
Danelski (1960) and Steamer (1986) offer two valuable studies within the judicial 
literature that provide theoretical and methodological bases from which to sketch a sturdy 
model of chief justice leadership. As highlighted above, Danelski’s 1960 work provides 
the institutional foundations that supply the landscape of chief justice leadership, namely 
the five interactive stages of the judicial decision-making process. Utilizing his basic 
institutional foundation, and appreciating its fundamental character as establishing the 
terrain upon which chief justice leadership traverses, this model goes further by adding 
considerations of structure and operation to chief justice leadership that Danelski does not 
address. 
Steamer (1986), meanwhile, highlights a methodological route to thoroughly 
study chief justice leadership. Specifically, his analysis divides chief justices into 
transformative and transactional leaders according to performance along the lines of 
Burns’s seminal 1978 work regarding transformative and transactional leadership. In 
such efforts, Steamer classifies chief justices into four categories in a 1 + 3 fashion. First 
and foremost, inspirational chief justices who possess conviction—Chief Justices 
Marshall, Hughes, and Warren—are transformative leaders who revolutionize the court’s 
impact on constitutional law. The rest of the chief justices, all inferior to inspirational 
justices, fall into three categories of transactional leaders bearing various stripes. These 
include persuasive and exemplar chiefs (Chief Justices Waite, Fuller, and White), chief 
justices involved with political and extra-court activities (Chief Justices Taft and Burger), 
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and chief justices minimized by short tenures Founding Era Chief Justices Jay, Rutledge, 
and Ellsworth and War Era Justices Chase, Stone, and Vinson). 
The methodology employed here is similar to that used in Steamer’s (1986) work, 
applying classic concepts from the leadership literature to the chief justice in order to 
examine the office and its leadership in new ways. Building from Steamer’s work, the 
argument here appreciates Steamer’s facility in adapting leadership concepts to study the 
office but differs on which concepts are selected and how they are applied. Where 
Steamer used Burn’s 1978 transformational and transactional leadership and evaluated 
efficacy of leadership, this paper uses Verba’s 1961 twin concepts of small-group 
leadership combined with Lewin et al.’s 1939 three-way behavioral typology to 
investigate execution of leadership. In this way, the focus of this work seeks to provide a 
closer view of the leadership that the office employs in carrying out the day-to-day 
functions involved in the judicial decision-making process, rather than concentrate on 
evaluative claims of performance (although some consideration of performance cannot be 
severed from the analysis of different behavioral leadership styles). By focusing on 
execution of leadership rather than on effectiveness of leadership, this work distinctly 
differs from Steamer’s. 
Leadership Scholarship 
The leadership scholarship offers work wholly independent of the court that can be 
adapted to illustrate the office’s leadership in operation. Importantly, this work comes 
from outside of the judicial literature. By doing so, it provides objective concepts and 
ideas from which can be drawn an analytical model of chief justice leadership. 
As mentioned above, the two main leadership studies applied in this model of 
chief justice leadership consist of Verba’s small-group leadership (1961) and Lewin et 
al.’s the three-way behavioral leadership typology (1939). The two key takeaways from 
this leadership scholarship highlight (1) the importance of social leadership over task 
leadership and (2) how the democratic default on the court makes democratic leadership 
the dominant form of chief justice leadership. A more thorough accounting of these 
leadership styles is provided below. 
LANDSCAPE: THE FIVE INTERACTIVE STAGES OF THE JUDICIAL 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
Before highlighting the democratic default, small-group leadership, and behavioral 
leadership, this section provides a brief description of each interactive stage involved in the 
judicial decision-making process, to set the landscape of where such leadership occurs. 
Certiorari 
Since Chief Justice Taft’s leadership in bringing about the enactment of the Judiciary Act 
of 1925 and its expansion of certiorari (or “cert”), the court possesses complete discretion 
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in deciding which cert petitions it will grant oral arguments to dispose of the merits of the 
case. This decision consists of two steps. First, to be considered by the justices at 
conference, cert petitions must be placed on the “discuss list.” Generally, the chief justice 
dominates the selections for the discuss list, but her determinations are not exclusive, as 
the associate justices can also suggest cert petitions to be included and all such 
suggestions are accepted for discussion. 
Second, at conference, the justices briefly discuss whether to grant or deny a cert 
petition. The chief justice introduces each petition and frames the issues to be discussed 
and considered, for which each petition normally receives about five minutes. In this 
process, the court has developed and adopted an internal “Rule of Four” that requires 
only four justices to agree to grant cert. Nonetheless, despite requiring fewer than half of 
the justices to approve of a hearing, roughly only 2 percent of the approximately 10,000 
cert petitions filed each year receive one. 
Oral Argument 
Following certiorari, oral argument constitutes the hearing in which counsel for each 
party highlights the arguments made in their filed briefs and all of the justices are free 
to participate in asking questions. This is the first time the justices engage collectively 
on the merits of a case and is the only public stage in the judicial decision-making 
process. As a matter of function, the chief justice presides over the hearing, which lasts 
for one hour with each side receiving thirty minutes to present its argument, although 
the chief justice can grant additional time in any given case (but this happens only 
infrequently). Most justices actively engage in asking questions, and the chief justice 
must monitor the proceeding to ensure that it moves along timely and that both sides 
are given their fair day in court, as well as maintain a bench that presents itself civilly 
and judiciously. 
Conference 
At the heart of the judicial decision-making process sits the conference, or the private 
meeting of the justices to discuss and vote on the merits of argued cases (and whether to 
grant cert petitions). Following the chief justice’s opening summary, comments, and 
framing of each case, each associate justice contributes his or her comments and 
viewpoints in descending order of seniority, starting with the senior associate justice. 
During this portion of the discussion, tradition forbids the justices, including the chief 
justice, from interrupting the speaking justice. After the first round of comments 
concludes, the justices take an initial vote, beginning with the junior associate justice and 
working their way back up to the chief justice, who votes last. If the initial vote does not 
result in unanimous agreement, the discussion opens up and the justices fully debate until 
all comments and viewpoints are expressed. In these instances, the chief justice must 
exercise astute democratic and social leadership, as well as timely task leadership, to 
maintain a healthy atmosphere and move the court along in its business. 
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Majority Opinion Assignment 
Following conference, opinions are assigned by the senior justice in the majority, which 
by custom is always the chief justice when in the majority. In such cases, the chief justice 
may assign the opinion to any majority justice, including herself, but must be perceived 
as doing so fairly—meaning even distribution of both important and mundane cases. As 
the judicial scholarship has made clear by its overwhelming concentration on this stage, 
this decision constitutes the most—perhaps only—concrete lever of power that the chief 
justice possesses in the judicial decision-making process. This power results from the fact 
that this decision plays a critical role in determining what direction the court’s final 
opinion will take as well as influences the judicial legacies of each justice. 
Opinion Drafting 
After an opinion has been assigned, the process of drafting it can take a variety of paths, 
whether one of smooth sailing as the justices in the majority largely agree on the 
decision’s outcome and its reasoning, or one that may require several rounds of 
negotiation with justices joining and abandoning the majority. During the ebb and flow of 
these internal transactions, the chief justice sits at the center of the court’s information 
network, meaning that although she cannot dictate that certain positions or arguments be 
advanced or eliminated, she does maintain a soft social presence in the process. 
Additionally, and importantly, each justice may write a concurring or dissenting opinion 
in every case, which again the chief justice may influence one way or another but 
possesses no formal power to include, shape, or prevent. 
STRUCTURE: THE DEMOCRATIC DEFAULT ON THE COURT 
As noted above, three conditions combine to create the democratic default on the court: 
life tenure, equal vote, and free voice. Life tenure means that the justices cannot lose their 
seats because of the decisions they make. They have a lifetime job. This provides them 
with judicial independence, an important underlying characteristic that allows the court to 
constitutionally function to the full extent that judicial review intends it to.  
Equal vote means that each justice, including the chief justice, has only one vote 
in the judicial decision-making process. Nine members means nine votes, one per justice. 
Consequently, in the final tally, each justice operates under the condition of judicial 
equality. Additionally, this makes the chief justice primes inter pares, or first among 
equals. The chief justice may lead the court, but she is not the court.  
Lastly, free voice means that each justice, when not drafting the majority opinion, 
remains free to write a concurrence or dissent in every case. Coupled with life tenure, this 
gives the associate justices the ability to write with complete judicial autonomy, as the chief 
justice possesses no formal authority to influence their decisions whether or not to write a 
concurrence or a dissent, nor possesses any control over what such opinions might say. 
Each of these three conditions of the democratic default significantly influences 
the structure in which the chief justice operates, making it vitally important that she 
Root  A Brief Sketch of Chief Justice Leadership  143 
appreciate how they affect the way she leads the court. In terms of both small-group and 
behavioral leadership, the chief justice must exercise sagacious social leadership within 
the ambit of democratic leadership. That may sound ironic for the court, especially 
because such conditions intentionally remove its members from the political process, but 
like any human group charged with executing responsibilities, the court remains a 
political animal. 
OPERATION: SMALL-GROUP AND BEHAVIORAL LEADERSHIP 
In assessment of chief justice leadership of the court, small-group and behavioral 
leadership provide two lenses with which to judiciously examine the office. Small-group 
leadership encompasses task and social leadership, which supply the everyday actions 
and considerations of guiding the court through the judicial decision-making process. 
Importantly, they animate the behavioral leadership styles of autocratic, laissez-faire, and 
democratic leadership. These behavioral styles, in turn, systematically provide analytical 
frameworks illustrating consistent patterns in how the chief justice leads the court, 
thereby also supplying the model’s methodology. 
Small-Group Leadership 
As the leader of nine justices on the court, the office exercises Verba’s (1961) small-
group leadership. Task leadership focuses on producing group outcomes, while social 
leadership concerns the individual well-being of each member as well as group cohesion. 
Unlike the typical small-group leader who leans toward either task or social leadership, 
however, during the judicial decision-making process, the associate justices expect the 
chief justice to exercise both task and social leadership. Consequently, the office 
demands comprehensive small-group leadership. 
On the task side, such leadership consists of choosing which cert petitions to place 
on the discuss list, presiding over oral argument, leading the conference discussion on 
argued cases (and cert petitions), assigning opinions when in the majority, and overseeing 
opinion drafting. Similar to those of most small-group leaders, the chief justice’s task 
leadership responsibilities are relatively straightforward; nonetheless, they cannot be 
ignored or neglected because they must be competently completed in order for the court 
to fulfill its essential function of deciding cases and issuing opinions. If the chief justice 
fails to lead the court in executing the responsibilities incumbent of the judicial decision-
making process, the associate justices will jockey with each other to fill the leadership 
void, which will produce a disproportionate amount of social strife relative to the number 
of opinions handed down. In this way, the court will never go without a task leader, but 
this does not solve its small-group leadership calculus. 
The key to solving this calculus is social leadership, for which the chief justice 
must work to ensure court cohesion, solidarity, and harmony by navigating the complex 
web of considerations intensified by the three conditions that create the democratic 
default. She must attempt to establish a healthy atmosphere on the court by seeking to 
reach broad agreement among the justices in decided cases. She does so by undertaking 
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efforts to minimize disagreements and cool tensions during oral argument, conference 
(both on cert petitions and argued cases), and opinion drafting. During oral argument and 
particularly conference, defusing disagreements often requires the chief justice to enter 
into the fray and evenhandedly mediate the argument as an impartial referee, a 
responsibility that involves immense emotional muscle and restraint alongside social 
adroitness and personal wisdom. In this capacity, as well, when assigning majority 
opinions, the chief justice must consider the justices’ workload, feelings, and aspirations 
in order to evenly disperse the court’s work and be perceived as fair in doing so, taking 
into account each justice’s various interests and expertise—including her own—and 
balancing them against each other. 
In addition to being a neutral referee during the various stages of the judicial 
decision-making process, at all times—and unlike the associate justices—the chief justice 
must maintain a heightened level of judicial decorum that not only commands formal 
deference but also, more importantly, engenders personal respect. Consequently, one 
thing a chief justice can never do is slight her colleagues in written opinions, even ones 
she vehemently disagrees with, which some associate justices are wont to do. The chief 
justice must rise above such temptation, both professionally and personally, for the social 
good of the court. 
Bringing all of these considerations together, the chief justice must exercise 
competent task leadership in order for the court to execute its essential function, but, 
more importantly, for the court to function efficiently and effectively, social leadership 
constitutes the key to successful chief justice leadership no matter which behavioral form 
it may take. 
Behavioral Leadership 
Autocratic Leadership. Classically defined as command-and-control leaders, 
autocratic leaders make all of the decisions for the group and seek no opinion, counsel, or 
votes from group members. Such a leader is the principal, while group members are the 
agents. This makes an autocratic leader a dominant task leader and one who may or may 
not exercise social leadership. 
While Chief Justice Marshall employed a sweeping autocratic hand in leading the 
court during its formative years, particularly in oral argument, conference, majority 
opinion assignment, and opinion drafting (cert did not exist on the Marshall Court), this 
form of chief justice leadership is antiquated to his time on the bench. Nonetheless, even 
though autocratic leadership finds only limited application on the modern court in 
composing the discuss list in the cert stage (i.e., task leadership) and, while technically in 
task operation but not social cohesion, majority opinion assignment, looking at 
Marshall’s leadership remains valuable in considering each of the classic types of 
behavioral leadership.  
During oral argument, an autocratic chief justice would simultaneously exercise task 
and social leadership either in silence or by exclusively questioning counsel. The latter route 
has never been employed; Chief Justice Marshall set a silent tone in leading his bench. In 
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either case, without meaningful verbal participation by any of the associate justices, an 
autocratic chief justice may command the associate justices to singularly function as note-
takers for the chief justice in helping to reach the court’s decision. In this capacity, the chief 
justice would not request any associate justices’ opinions but rather would instruct each of 
them to simply keep track of important items that arise in oral argument. 
At conference, the Great Chief Justice dominated the justices’ nightly discussions 
that took place in their boardinghouse accommodations, where they lived together during 
the annual winter term in Washington, DC, when the court sat in session. These 
boardinghouse arrangements played a crucial role in Marshall’s autocratic leadership by 
creating physical conditions conducive to it. From this base of the home hearth, his 
command of the cases, their issues, and the applicable law were complete and, coupled 
with his eloquently simple turns of phrase and the endearing force of his personality and 
temperament, his task and social leadership blended together and proved to be an 
instrumental spearhead in determining the court’s decisions and opinions. 
As a result, the majorities he commanded were formed through astute social 
leadership. Marshall found ways to speak to each associate justice and comfortably 
persuade all on correct (his) outcome in the case. When he could not convert associate 
justices to his view, he found ways to roundly criticize them around the boardinghouse, 
making their daily lives uncomfortable until they acquiesced to his position. With 
Marshall leading in such fashion, his majorities were usually unanimous, particularly in 
seminal constitutional cases such as Marbury v. Madison (1803), McCulloch v. Maryland 
(1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824).  
He recognized that unanimity must be the norm to transform the court from a 
weak institution of only passing and nominal governing import into one that would grow 
into a constitutional force. To achieve this goal, along with plying an autocratic hand at 
conference, he also exercised autocratic task leadership by eliminating the old English 
practice of seriatim, in which each justice wrote a separate opinion in every case, 
replacing it with one in which a single justice spoke for the majority. Moreover, he 
established the tradition that, whenever in the majority (which Marshall usually was), the 
chief justice would assign the opinion to its author. Naturally, he frequently assigned the 
opinion to himself, writing 47 percent of Marshall Court decisions and 58 percent of 
constitutional ones. In landmark constitutional cases, he wrote every opinion except for 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816), in which he recused himself because his brother 
possessed a significant interest in the case. 
In drafting opinions, meanwhile, Marshall demonstrated simple logic and clear 
prose, coupled with flashes of majestic and sweeping phrases for rhetorical effect. He set 
a strong tone for the associate justices that when drafting opinions, the court would speak 
clearly and forcefully. Frequent unanimous opinions also added to this clarity and 
forcefulness. In instances when justices sought to write concurrence or dissent, Marshall 
stoutly discouraged such behavior on account of damaging the court’s credibility. 
Marshall maintained an acute awareness of the institutional statecraft in which he 
was engaged. Consequently, he intentionally made an attempt—and succeeded—at 
building up the court to be a powerful institution of the national government and a 
coequal branch with the president and Congress. This, in turn, enhanced the prestige of 
146  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences  Vol. 21 (2018)  
the court and the justices, which gave Marshall additional leverage to autocratically 
command his court. 
Laissez-Faire Leadership. Laissez-faire leadership is classically defined as hands-
off leadership, in which the group leader is uninvolved with group members and 
participates very little, if any, in decision making. Consequently, such leaders make no 
policies or group-related decisions (i.e., no task leadership), nor are they involved with 
their members (i.e., no social leadership). Instead, group members are responsible for all 
tasks, processes, and decisions, along with creating and maintaining group cohesion. As a 
result of such complete group governance, laissez-faire leaders generally hold little to no 
authority within their groups. 
As Chief Justice Stone’s tenure dramatically demonstrated, laissez-faire 
leadership as a dominant form is not appropriate on the court. The chief justice, although 
not an autocratic command-and-control leadership position, nevertheless has clearly 
defined tasks that are required to be completed for the court to competently function, and 
the associate justices expect the chief justice to execute these tasks. This is the first aspect 
of leading the court at which the chief justice must succeed if the office is to lead the 
institution in any way. 
Equally important on the social side, while the associate justices are highly 
intelligent, ambitious, and self-motivated individuals, they operate in an institutional 
setting that demands personally attentive leadership from the chief. Leaving the associate 
justices to man the bench without social direction, discipline, and diplomacy, as Stone 
did, leaves the court in institutional tatters as the associate justices fight each other for 
leadership in every stage. [See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin (1942), for which Justices Roberts 
and Black controled the certiorari process; Smith v. Allwright (1944), for which Stone 
accepted Justice Jackson’s majority opinion assignment advice concerning the public’s 
reception of the court’s controversial ruling in a racially charged voting rights case 
arising from Texas; and Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America 
(1945), for which Justice Jackson’s concurrence sparked an internal war with Justice 
Black over the latter’s lack of recusing himself for a conflict of interest.] 
When selecting cert petitions to place on the discuss list, and like his laissez-faire 
leadership in majority opinion assignment, Stone allowed far too much leeway to the 
associate justices in its composition. He did not decisively control the process, which 
resulted in numerous petitions for discussion and thus irritated the justices in terms of 
frivolous petitions being given time for assessment and evaluation. Moreover, at 
conference, and like his leadership on argued cases, Stone’s laissez-faire leadership 
allowed discussion to ramble on lengthily without decisive decision making. Thus, the 
justices spent an unreasonable amount of time working through a largely procedural 
matter rather than disposing of it in a preferred, rote manner. This failure of both task and 
social leadership during a mundane stage of the judicial decision-making process raised 
the ire of the justices and set the tone from the beginning that fostered antagonism and 
discord among them. 
This rancor and division easily made their way into oral arguments on the Stone 
Court. Although Stone led for only five years, the derisive voices of opinion tore his court 
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apart in open air, free for the nation and world to see, as the associate justices chided each 
other freely on the bench. A tit-for-tat mentality among intelligent men rapidly descended 
into childish slights and barbs designed not to unravel the deeper issues of the cases but 
instead to insult and humiliate judicial enemies seated on the same supreme bench. 
Meanwhile, Stone exercised no task leadership aiming to quell the justices’ pointed attacks 
at each other, soiling their social relationships and leaving the court to look like a pack of 
wild dogs ravenously foaming at the mouth for each other’s demise. 
Unsurprisingly, this caused the associate justices to more deeply cascade at 
conference into their petty skirmishes of personal rifts and slights. Stone fostered such 
hostile relations by allowing the associate justices to extensively debate in a freewheeling 
fashion, one that strongly resembled an upper-level law-school seminar course seeking 
not to arrive at any definite decision but rather to analyze all of the possible positions that 
a case presented. Coupled with the social characteristics of hyper-egotistical justices 
appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt beginning in the late 1930s—namely 
Justices Black (1937), Frankfurter (1939), Douglas (1939), and Jackson (1941)—this 
unguided task leadership proved to be too much for seating a bench capable of civil 
disagreement. As a result, conferences on the Stone Court exhausted and strained the 
associate justices physically, mentally, psychologically, and socially. The justices also 
frequently failed to conclude on time, often being held over until well into the following 
week, which further grated on them. In each of these ways, Stone lost control of the 
conference and thereby lost the ability to corral the Roosevelt justices. This, in turn, 
disaffected his leadership of the court in all five stages. 
Moreover, Justice Stone allowed the social acrimony of the conference to spill 
over afterward, most notably by allowing the associate justices far too free a rein in 
majority opinion assignment by being a frequent dissenter. In exercising this negative 
task leadership, he abdicated influence over opinions’ content, tone, and language, which 
are important for steering the general course of the court. When he did find himself in the 
majority, Stone would entertain assignment suggestions from the associate justices, thus 
creating social competition and jealousy among them. 
During opinion drafting, meanwhile, the associate justices began to express 
themselves more stridently in majority opinions and more frequently (and stridently) in 
concurrences and dissents. This converted poor task leadership into poor social 
leadership. In terms of task leadership, it slowed down the ability to timely produce 
opinions, which brought groans from both the associate justices and the public. Socially, 
and published in print that history continues to encounter with discomfort, the associate 
justices wrote with a fevered pitch of animosity and division never before seen on the 
court. It was a bench at war with itself, producing written opinions that detailed the 
various battlefields and their casualties. The result spoke poorly for the court, its eminent 
status as the nation’s high bench, and Chief Justice Stone, who otherwise enjoyed a 
sterling and highly celebrated judicial record as an associate justice (in which he sat in all 
eight seats, including senior associate justice). 
In addition to difficult personalities and their acrimonious expressions in writing, 
Stone also attempted to lead the court from home while the associate justices established 
their chambers in the new Supreme Court Building, completed in 1935. When the court 
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first moved into its new home, Stone, then an associate justice, growled about its 
grandiose size and ornate architecture, which, he complained, made the justices look like 
nine black beetles scuttling about the Temple of Karnak. He hated the new facility and 
continued to work from home even after being appointed chief justice in 1941. By the 
end of his tenure in 1946, only he continued working from home. Thus, he exercised 
laissez-faire task and social leadership not only in terms of failing to lead during the 
judicial decision-making process but also as an absent leader in terms of physical 
presence. It is difficult to lead a small group of ambitious and egotistical men and mass 
them together into a productive and cohesive unit when they assemble daily without the 
leader’s presence, particularly when they do so by the leader’s own choosing. 
Democratic Leadership. Democratic leadership concerns a balance between task 
and social leadership in which leaders follow structures to ensure that decisions are made 
and objectives achieved (i.e., task leadership) while at the same time taking into account 
group members’ needs, thoughts, and feelings (i.e., social leadership). Such leaders lead 
in the decision-making process and may exercise influence, but they do not singularly 
make decisions like autocratic leaders nor allow the group to make decisions without any 
leadership from them like laissez-faire leaders. 
In exercising task leadership as a first among equals, a democratic leader leads 
and initiates discussion in which decisions are reached through a participatory process 
followed by a democratic vote that results in either a unanimous, consensus, or majority 
agreement. As a social leader, meanwhile, a democratic leader looks at all group 
members in terms of responsibilities rather than status or rank and therefore equally 
consults others in decision making. Such leaders find ways to involve everyone in the 
group in reaching the group’s decision. In other words, each member contributes input 
into the group’s discussion and exercises a vote in its final decision. This makes each 
group member feel like an integral part of the decision and take some level of ownership 
in that decision, at least when they are in the majority. When members are in dissent, a 
democratic leader seeks to assuage their rejection by assuring them that their ideas were 
fully considered. 
Democratic leadership constitutes the primary form of leadership employed by 
modern chief justices. As a result, and unlike Marshall, the chief justice must work with 
the associate justices rather than dictate her own opinions as those for the court. She may 
lead the conference discussions on cert petitions and argued cases, as well as preside at 
oral argument, assign majority opinions when in the majority, and oversee opinion 
drafting, but she cannot demand that the associate justices approach cases, decide them, 
or draft their opinions in one way or another. Rather, chief justice leadership is closely 
tied to participation and influence, which are tools of democratic leadership best 
deployed through skillful social leadership, far from command and control as exercised 
by autocratic leaders. 
The chief justice also cannot rely on laissez-faire leadership, even though this 
form may often arise in conjunction with democratic leadership. The chief justice must 
exercise competent task leadership, which requires plying a steady hand at the judicial till 
to ensure that quality opinions are produced. More importantly, though, she must be a 
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constant social presence among the associate justices and around the court. She must 
function like a social thermometer, constantly taking the temperature of the associate 
justices and making sure passions do not rise to explosively hot levels or descend to 
irretrievably cold depths. Within the confines of the democratic default, democratic 
leadership emphasizes social leadership over task leadership by making the associate 
justices integral contributors to the court’s opinions. This means that, unlike an associate 
justice, to effectively lead the court in its essential function, the chief justice must be just 
as skilled a political negotiator as a competent legal judge. She must allow discussion and 
debate to prevail at oral argument, at conference (cert petitions and argued cases), and in 
written opinions but, unlike Stone, not to a laissez-faire extent that results in 
unproductiveness at best and bitter personal warfare at worst. Instead, the chief justice 
must be able to tread the middle ground between producing opinions on the task side, and 
handling the justices’ personalities, partisanship, and judicial philosophies on the social 
side, all while remaining comfortable with the mediating effects that democratic 
leadership often espouses on the court. 
As a prime example of such skillful democratic leadership, Chief Justice Warren 
led a carousel court of numerous justices that—at base—continued to consist of a core of 
Roosevelt justices held over from the Stone Court (and through the Vinson Court). As a 
former governor of California, Warren politically understood the court’s mediating 
tendencies and allowed the justices to express their individuality and predilections. At the 
same time, Warren fashioned strong agreement and even unanimity in some of the most 
controversial cases in the court’s history (e.g., Brown v. Board of Education 1954). He 
worked daily with the associate justices one on one, exercising skillful social leadership 
in the justices’ chambers and the court’s hallways that converted task outputs into a 
constitutional revolution in several areas, including racial desegregation, political 
reapportionment, and criminal justice. He gave the associate justices free rein to express 
themselves but kept a lid on that expression in oral argument, in conference, and during 
opinion drafting in their majorities, concurrences, and dissents. 
When composing the discuss list for cert petitions, Warren exercised a fair 
amount of single-handed autocratic leadership, but this did not upset the associate 
justices, who accepted his decisions without much, if any, push back. Moreover, when an 
associate justice wanted to add a petition to the list, Warren not only never refused but 
also never expressed any verbal disagreement to its inclusion. As such, he skillfully led in 
terms of both task and social leadership by composing the list, keeping the associate 
justices content with his selections, and including theirs without question when 
suggested. At conference discussing cert petitions, as well, Warren proved adept at letting 
all of the justices speak their views about whether to grant oral argument, while keeping 
comments limited so as to move the process along. 
At oral argument, Warren combined both task and social leadership with laissez-
faire and democratic leadership to create a well-behaved bench. Often quiet but not silent, 
the chief justice allowed the associate justices plenty of time to talk and ask questions of 
counsel, thus using task leadership to demonstrate social leadership and allowing laissez-
faire leadership to couple with democratic leadership. When an associate justice threatened 
the civility that Warren worked hard to cultivate on the bench, however, he would step in 
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and redirect the discussion to avoid rising tensions. In this way, Warren interjected at oral 
argument when he had to, in order to keep the justices functioning peacefully. 
Warren applied democratic task and social leadership most impressively at 
conference. Working with an intensely egotistical and caustic core of Roosevelt justices, 
he subdued them into a professionally working team even as their personal fissures 
continued to split them apart. He led at conference by framing the cases in his desired 
direction but also exercised patience in allowing the associate justices to present their 
views and form their alliances. The reasons for deciding a case a certain way mattered 
little to Warren. Instead, he was much more interested in reaching a certain decision, 
however that may be done. As such, his task leadership to reach certain decisions created 
significant space to exercise social leadership in allowing the associate justices to 
democratically participate and influence one another. At the same time, however, Warren 
exercised the leadership prerogatives of the chief justice and made sure that his 
colleagues kept on task and off each other. 
Warren also democratically spread his assignments of majority opinions across 
the associate justices and himself, sometimes using such assignment to entice a justice 
into the majority (task leadership), and at other times seeking to maintain a healthy 
balance of opinion writers on the court (social leadership). Moreover, only in the truly 
landmark of landmark cases (e.g., Brown or Miranda v. Arizona 1966) did Warren 
consistently assign the opinion to himself. Otherwise, he spread desirable opinions 
equally among the associate justices, although he had his favorites, such as Justice 
Brennan, and his not-so-favorites, like Justice Frankfurter. Usually in the majority, 
Warren made good use of this concrete lever of power held by the chief justice. 
Similar to his ambivalence to the reasoning of how a decision was reached at 
conference, Warren displayed a significant amount of deference as to the shape and form 
of an opinion during its drafting. He kept track of the development of an opinion but 
largely delegated its course to the assigned author. In this way, both his task and social 
leadership during this phase resembled a combination of laissez-faire and democratic 
leadership, but with a much more democratic tilt, as he empowered the author to take 
control but did not completely abdicate authority and oversight in its direction. Also in 
terms of democratic leadership, he recognized the necessity of concurrences to bring 
justices into the majority—which differed significantly from an autocratic Marshall and 
cannot be compared to an absent Stone—thereby achieving, through the exercise of open 
and inclusive democratic task leadership, many significant results that otherwise would 
not have been socially possible. 
In essence, Warren understood how democratic participation and decision making 
were required to make the court function to its greatest institutional capability. Following 
his leadership, which marks the beginning of the modern chief justice, each of his 
successors—Chief Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts—has followed to varying 
degrees Warren’s example in making democratic leadership his dominant form of 
guiding the court during the judicial decision-making process. 
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CONCLUSION: LEADING THE THIRD COEQUAL BRANCH 
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
In brief summation, the mixture of landscape, structure, and operation of chief justice 
leadership in the judicial decision-making process emphasizes social and democratic 
leadership. This does not, however, foreclose the inquiry from further investigation. 
Quite the opposite; it provides a baseline from which to build more sophisticated models 
of how the chief justice leads the court in its essential function of hearing and deciding 
cases. Nonetheless, it highlights a key finding: To successfully lead the court, the chief 
justice must be just as good a political negotiator as she is a competent legal judge. 
While standing as the third coequal branch of American government, and the one of legal 
and constitutional import, the court remains a political animal that must be tamed by 
skillful chief justice leadership. 
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